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The vast majority of the force employed by the Italians to crush local 
resistance in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica was composed of Libyans, Eritreans 
and Ethiopians. The article examines why the Italians came to rely so 
heavily on colonial soldiers. It highlights two key predicaments the Italians 
faced: how to contend with the social, economic and political repercussions 
that military recruitment for the counter-insurgency created in East Africa; 
and the extent to which they could depend on forces raised in Libya itself. 
Finally, the article offers an initial assessment of how the counter-insurgency 
exacerbated tensions between Libyans and East Africans. 
 
Introduction 
The insurgency in Iraq from 2003 onwards has created a renewed interest in the 
comparative study of counter-insurgencies. British, American and French counter-
insurgency campaigns in the twentieth century have received most of the attention.2 
Little has been said in this context about the lengthy, difficult and bloody attempts by 
the Italian government and its armed forces to subdue the colonies of Tripolitania 
and Cyrenaica which were later united and renamed Libya.3 Indeed, events in Libya 
predated the birth of the term 'counter-insurgency'. But like other colonial 'small 
wars' of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, the suppression in Libya fits into 
the definition of counter-insurgency used by David Kilcullen and others – 'all means 
adopted to suppress an insurgency'; in this case a 'resistance insurgency' in which the 
                                                
1 The author wishes to thank Bruce Collins, Shane Doyle, Luigi Goglia and Brian Sullivan for their 
invaluable suggestions. 
2 See, for instance: Philippe Francois, 'Waging counter-insurgency in Algeria: A French point of view', 
Military Review, Vol. 88, Iss. 5, (2008), pp.56-67; Gian Gentile, ‘A strategy of tactics: population-centric 
COIN and the army’, Parameters, Vol. 39, Iss. 3, (2009), pp.5-17; David French, The British Way in 
Counter-Insurgency, 1945-1967, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Larisa Deriglazova, Great 
Powers, Small Wars: Asymmetric Conflict since 1945, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014). 
3 For rare exceptions, which mention Italian counter-insurgency efforts in Libya briefly, see: Alexander B. 
Downes, 'Draining the sea by filling the graves: investigating the effectiveness of indiscriminate violence as a 
counter-insurgency strategy’, Civil Wars, Vol. 9, Iss. 4, (2007), pp.420-444; Simon Anglim, 'Callwell versus 
Graziani: how the British Army applied ‘small wars’ techniques in major operations in Africa and the 
Middle East, 1940–41', Small Wars & Insurgencies, Vol. 19, Iss. 4, (2008), pp.588-608. 
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occupying Italians were the initiators while the insurgents sought to preserve the 
status quo.4 
 
Debates about events in Libya during the colonial period have largely been restricted 
to Libya itself, Italy and historians of these two countries. Italy's military strategy and 
operational conduct during the repression of local resistance have been examined by 
Giorgio Rochat, Angelo Del Boca, Nicola Labanca, Brian Sullivan, John Gooch and, 
recently, Federica Saini Fasanotti.5 These studies have highlighted the Italians' tactical 
learning curve. They also brought to light the tensions between the attempts of 
colonial and military leaders to win local hearts and minds on the one hand, and far 
more radical actions akin to ethnic cleansing on the other.6 Luigi Goglia has offered 
an in-depth analysis of the capture, trial and execution of Omar al-Mukhtar, the 
revolt's most prominent leader.7 Anna Baldinetti and Ali Abdullatif Ahmida studied 
the impact of the revolt and its repression on Libyan society and national identity.8  
 
One aspect of the counter-insurgency which has not been studied sufficiently is the 
role played by colonial troops, the vast majority of the force employed by the Italians 
to crush local resistance. European states were slow to recognise the immense debt 
they owed to the peoples of their colonies for their military contribution during the 
two world wars. The discussion of the role of indigenous recruits in colonial 
counter-insurgencies remains largely in the shadows. The Italian case study provides 
an extreme, though not unique, example of European reliance on colonial soldiers for 
the preservation and enlargement of an imperial edifice. The article will address this 
topic by focusing on four main themes. First of all, it will analyse why the Italians 
came to rely so heavily on colonial soldiers to do most of their fighting. Secondly, it 
will illustrate how social, economic and political developments in the Italian colony of 
Eritrea, and in East Africa more broadly, impacted on patterns of recruitment for the 
                                                
4 David Kilcullen, 'Counterinsurgency redux', Survival, Vol. 48, Iss. 4, (2006), p. 2. 
5 Giorgio Rochat, 'The repression of resistance in Cyrenaica (1927-1931)’, in Enzo Santarelli et al (ed.), 
Omar al-Mukhtar: the Italian Reconquest of Libya (London: Darf, 1986), pp.35-115; Angelo Del Boca, Gli 
italiani in Libia: dal fascismo al Gheddafi, (Milan: Mondadori, 1994); Nicola Labanca, La guerra italiana per la 
Libia, 1911-1931, (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2012); Brian Sullivan, 'A thirst for glory: Mussolini and the Italian 
military, 1922-1936' (PhD dissertation, University of Columbia, 1983); John Gooch, 'Re-conquest and 
suppression: Fascist Italy's pacification of Libya and Ethiopia, 1922-1939', Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 28, 
Iss. 6, (2005), pp.1005-1032; Federica Saini Fasanotti, Libia, 1922-1931, (Rome: Stato maggiore 
dell'esercito, 2012). 
6 Some historians have gone as far as accusing the Italians of committing genocide: Eric Salerno, Genocidio in 
Libia: Le atrocità nascoste dell’avventura coloniale italiana, (Rome: Manifestolibri, 2005). 
7 Luigi Goglia, ‘The capture, trial and death of Omar Al-Mukhtar in the Italian press’, in Enzo Santarelli et al 
(ed.), Omar al-Mukhtar: the Italian Reconquest of Libya (London: Darf, 1986); Luigi Goglia, ‘L’epilogo della 
lotta di Omar al Mukhtar in un documento della Regia Aeronautica’, Africana, 1 (1994-95), pp. 89-98.  
8 Anna Baldinetti, The Origins of the Libyan Nation, (London and New York: Routledge, 2010); Ali Abdullatif 
Ahmida, Forgotten Voices: Power and Agency in Colonial and Postcolonial Libya, (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2005). 
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counter-insurgency in Libya. The third theme is the Italian dilemma regarding the 
loyalty of the forces they raised in Libya itself. Finally, the article will offer an initial 
assessment of how the counter-insurgency exacerbated tensions between East 
Africans and Libyans. This four-levelled approach illustrates the crucial importance of 
indigenous forces in Italy’s counter-insurgency operations. It also highlights how the 
recruitment of colonial troops could have social and political implications that go far 
beyond the immediate repression of uprisings.  
 
The Military Context 
Before examining the role of colonial soldiers, it is necessary to briefly survey the 
history of Italian efforts to subdue Libya. Italian forces first landed in Tripolitania and 
Cyrenaica, then two provinces of the Ottoman Empire, in October 1911. When the 
Italo-Turkish War ended in 1912 the territories under Italian control were primarily 
those close to the Mediterranean coastline. In 1913 the Italians advanced into the 
Fezzan in south-western Libya and managed to capture the main oases by early 1914. 
However, supply lines were long and vulnerable and began to come under attack in 
the summer of 1914. By the end of the year, the Italians had been driven out of the 
Fezzan and, at the beginning of August 1915, they only held four coastal towns in 
Tripolitania. In Cyrenaica, the forces of the Sanusi Order prevented Italian troops 
from expanding past the coastal areas. In both regions the Italians were forced to 
sign a series of accords giving local leaders autonomy. In 1918 urban notables and 
rural leaders formed the Tripolitanian Republic (1918-1920) and a Tripolitanian 
parliament was set up in June 1919. In October 1920 the Italian government granted 
members of the Sanusi family a monthly allowance and agreed to a Cyrenaican 
parliament. The latter was formed in April 1921 and functioned to the end of March 
1923.9 
 
The more or less peaceful co-existence between the Italians and the semi-
autonomous Arab entities in Libya came to an end in January 1922 when the Colonial 
Minister Giovanni Amendola and Count Giuseppe Volpi, the Governor of 
Tripolitania, launched the military ‘re-conquest’ of the colony. The first zone to be 
cleared of hostile tribes was to the east and west of Tripoli. The Tripolitanian nomad 
tribes were divided and the Italians endeavoured to capitalise on these divisions. 
They distinguished between ‘rebel’ and ‘submitted’ (sottomessi) tribes and allowed the 
latter to carry arms for self-defence. The future Marshal Rodolfo Graziani, who 
earned his reputation as a maverick colonial commander in Tripolitania, also sought 
to exploit ancient feuds between Arabs and Berbers. In a series of campaigns the 
Italians managed to extend their control first to the hinterland around Homs and 
then gradually pushed southwards and eastwards. By the end of 1925 the Italians' 
                                                
9 John Wright, Libya: A Modern History, (London: Croom Helm, 1981), pp. 29-31; Ahmida, Forgotten Voices, p. 
30; Sullivan, ‘A thirst for glory’, pp.213-214; Baldinetti, The Origins, p.45. 
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position in Tripolitania was much more stable, allowing Benito Mussolini to visit 
Tripoli in April 1926 (Italy’s military attaché in London would later claim that the 
Fascist government was ‘sufficiently strong to impose the needful coercion on the 
territories’ whereas the previous Liberal government had been weak and indecisive). 
The last major operations in western Libya were the capture of the oases along the 
29th parallel and the seizure of Sirtica and the coastal area linking Tripolitania and 
Cyrenaica in the early months of 1928.10  
 
The subjugation of Cyrenaica proved much more difficult and lengthy. The Italians 
launched a surprise attack on Sanusi camps in March 1923. Two days later Colonial 
Minister Luigi Federzoni renounced all agreements with the Sanusi. The initiative 
soon shifted to the rebels who ambushed and inflicted heavy losses on 7th Eritrean 
Battalion at Bir Bilal in June. Follow-up attacks pushed the Italians back everywhere. 
Unlike Tripolitania, where the rebels did not have a central command and the Italians 
could literally divide and conquer, in Cyrenaica the resistance was united and led by 
the very able Omar al-Mukhtar. The rebels used small, mobile formations which 
tended to melt away and evade capture when confronted by a superior force. The 
mountainous and wooded terrain of the hinterland south of the coastal plain assisted 
the rebels and hindered Italian efforts. To overcome their difficulties, Italian 
commanders tried a number of tactics which included, at one stage, the construction 
of a line of fortified posts.11 Nonetheless, the resistance persisted and the Arabs 
spoke till very late in the campaign of ‘the government of the day and the 
government of the night'.12  
 
In late 1928 Marshal Pietro Badoglio, the Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff, 
was appointed joint governor of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. In 1929 Badoglio agreed 
to a truce with Omar al-Mukhtar which lasted a few months. When the truce 
collapsed the counter-insurgency entered its final and most brutal stage. In March 
1930 Graziani, who had distinguished himself in Tripolitania, was appointed as 
Badoglio's deputy and charged with crushing the revolt in Cyrenaica. Badoglio 
wanted to isolate the rebels from the rest of the population. The towns along the 
coast were firmly under Italian control but the hinterland was not. On 25 June 1930 
Italian troops began clearing out the mountainous region of Jabal al-Akhdar. Within 
nine months between 80,000 and 100,000 people were driven out of their homes, 
made to march great distances and confined inside barbed wire enclosures in a 
                                                
10 Sullivan, 'A thirst for glory', p.228; Saini Fasanotti, Libia, p.127; A. G. Coppi, ‘Recent operations of the 
Italian troops in Libya’, RUSI Journal, Vol. 74, Iss. 493, (1929), p. 148.  
11 Sullivan, 'A thirst for glory', p.231; Saini Fasanotti, Libia, p.248; Rochat, 'The repression', p.42. 
12 E. E. Evans-Pritchard, The Sanusi of Cyrenaica (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949), p.173. 
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number of concentration camps on the coastal strip.13 Conditions in these camps 
were terrible. Estimates of the human death toll vary between 40,000 and 65,000.14 
 
In late 1930 and early 1931 Graziani led an expedition deep into the desert to 
capture the remote rebel stronghold of Kufra. To prevent the rebels from finding 
refuge in and obtaining supplies from Egypt, a 270km barrier of barbed wire 
entanglements was constructed along the Egyptian border between April and 
September 1931. Increasingly isolated, Omar al-Mukhtar, by now in his seventies 
according to some estimates, was eventually caught under his dead horse during a 
skirmish. After a brief trial he was executed on 16 September 1931 in the 
concentration camp at Suluq, south of Benghazi, in front of some 20,000 deportees. 
On 24 January 1932 Badoglio declared that the rebellion was officially over and 
praised Graziani.15 By the end of the uprising, Badoglio would have undoubtedly 
endorsed David French's conclusion that the 'key to a successful counter-insurgency 
campaign was not winning the hearts and minds of the population, but establishing 
physical control over them’.16 
 
'Warrior races' and 'warlike virtues' 
After independence, the participation of colonial soldiers in crushing local resistance 
was played down by the Libyan state. In Lion of the Desert (1981), a film primarily 
funded by Muammar Gaddafi's regime, tarboush-wearing East Africans appear from 
time to time, but the main brunt of the fighting is carried out by Italian soldiers and 
Fascist black-shirts. No Libyan soldiers fighting on the Italian side are to be seen.17 
However, a quick glance at the units deployed in Libya throughout most of the 
period of ‘re-conquest’ reveals that Italian counter-insurgency operations were 









                                                
13 Sullivan, 'A thirst for glory', pp.242-46; Evans-Pritchard, The Sanusi, pp.88-89; Ahmida, Forgotten Voices, 
p.42; Baldinetti, The Origins, p.48.  
14 On the difficulty of estimating the exact number of Libyans who died in the camps, see: Luigi Goglia, ‘A 
proposito di una biografia su Italo Balbo’, Africa, Vol. 42, Iss. 1, (1987), pp.152-157. 
15 Gooch, 'Re-conquest and suppression', p.1020; Rochat, 'The repression', p.87-92; Archivio Centrale 
dello Stato [ACS], Fondo Graziani [FG], s.8, f. 12/1, 'Ordine del giorno', 24 January 1932. 
16 French, The British Way, p.7. 
17 For more on the film see: Clarissa Clò, 'Mediterraneo interrupted: perils and potentials of representing 
Italy’s occupations in Greece and Libya through Film', Italian Culture, Vol. 27, Iss. 2, (2009), pp.104-109. 
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Table 1: Troops station in Libya, 1914-192818 
Year Colonial troops Italian troops 
1914-15 19,000  50,500 
1915-16 14,000  61,000 
1916-17 18,000  48,000 
1917-18 18,000  48,000 
1918-19 18,500  57,000 
1919-20 21,500  25,000 
1920-21 21,300  5,700 
1921-22 23,100  4,500 
1922-23 31,600  1,900 
December 1924 23,792  11,223 
December 1925 23,990  13,163* 
December 1926 22,723  14,130* 
September 1927 25,820  17,448* 
November 1928 28,558  12,672* 
*The number includes a contingent of volunteer members of the Milizia Volontaria 
per la Sicurezza Nazionale (MVSN), also known as 'Black Shirts'.    
 
During the First World War colonial officials in Rome were very reluctant to have 
'coloured' troops serving in Italy. For Colonial Minister Gaspare Colosimo the 
preferred solution for manpower shortages on the Italian front in 1916 was to send 
Eritrean forces to Libya to relieve 'white' troops, who would then be sent to fight in 
northern Italy.19 However, when it came to the counter-insurgency in Libya, Italian 
priorities were reversed. Already in early operations in Tripolitania in 1922, instead 
of relying on 'white' troops, Italian officers forged a force that combined Eritrean 
battalions (which had an average of 750 men per battalion), Libyan camel- and horse-
mounted units, and irregular bands. In 1923, when Colonial Minister Federzoni 
discovered that no more troops could be sent from Eritrea, he proposed to bring 
metropolitan troops to furnish garrisons for forts and advanced posts, freeing the 
'coloured' troops to be used for offensive operations.20 
 
                                                
18 ACS, Fondo Badoglio [FB], b.1, f.3, sf.5; Ministero Africa Italiana, Direzione Generale Affari Politici, 
Archivio Segreto [MAI, AS], b.1, f.1/2. 
19 Archivio Storico del Ministero dell’Africa Italiana [ASMAI], p.115/3, f. 36-37-38, Colosimo to War 
Ministry, 11 May 1916; Martini to Tripoli, 16 May 1916; Colosimo to Asmara, 23 June 1916. 
20 Gooch 'Re-conquest and Suppression', pp.1007-1008. 
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Why were colonial soldiers so central for the Italian effort? The use of colonial 
troops in Libya offered three clear advantages: political expediency, cost and 
suitability. The political advantage of employing colonial soldiers instead of Italian 
conscripts derives from what we would now call loss aversion. Captain Rodolfo 
Corselli, who took part in the war of 1911-12 and remained in Libya until 1913, 
pointed out in his book La guerra in colonia (1914) that the loss of colonial troops had 
fewer repercussions in the metropole and consequently placed less pressure on 
colonial policy.21 The First World War, during which Italy suffered heavy losses, 
contributed to the reluctance to commit very large metropolitan forces to the Libyan 
theatre. Furthermore, sending Italian conscripts to fight prolonged campaigns in 
Africa was ineffective. An inter-ministerial committee, which looked into potential 
manpower solutions for Libya in 1926, was told by military officials that conscripted 
troops were 'discontent' to serve in the colonies, exerted pressure to be repatriated 
and did not tend to perform very well.22 It is difficult not to agree with Giulia 
Barrera's comment that:  
 
By using Eritreans, and not Italians [...] the Italian government was able to 
continue pursuing an expansionist colonial policy in Somalia and Libya without 
running the risk of the political backlash that the death of Italian soldiers could 
have caused.23 
 
Another key reason why the Italians preferred to use colonial troops was financial: 
Eritrean and Libyan troops were cheaper to maintain than Italian soldiers. Colonial 
soldiers were recruited on a voluntary basis for a two-year term. On completing 
their initial period of service soldiers had the option to sign on for an extra two 
years. According to the 1926 military regulations for Libya, an Italian private was 
entitled to a basic daily pay of 2.25 Lire, supplemented by a further 3.50 Lire per day 
for colonial service. Meanwhile an ascari, who was at the bottom of the colonial 
military hierarchy, was entitled to a basic daily pay of 1.50 Lire during his first two-
year term (with the sum increasing to 1.75 during the second term and 2.00 during 
the third). Ascaris who were posted outside their colony received a further allowance 
of 1 Lira per day.24 In other words, a colonial soldier cost the Italian treasury less 
                                                
21 Luigi Goglia, 'Popolazioni, eserciti africani e truppe indigene nella dottrina italiana della guerra coloniale', 
Mondo Contemporaneo, Vol. 2, (2006), p.18. 
22 ACS, FB, s. 4, s. 6, ‘Comitato interministeriale per la questioni militari coloniali’, 4 March 1926. 
23 Giulia Barrera, ‘Racial hierarchies in colonial Eritrea’, in Patrizia Palumbo (ed.), A Place in the Sun: Africa in 
Italian Colonial Culture from Post-Unification to the Present, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 
pp.84-85.  
24 ASMAI, p.115/3, f. 39-40-41, ‘Copie del nuovo ordinamento militare per la Libia’, 16 November 1926.  A 
similar cost ratio between colonial and metropolitan soldiers existed in the British army in 1949. See: 
French, The British Way, p.36. 
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than half the sum of an Italian soldier. A further financial advantage was that colonial 
troops were allocated fewer rations.25 
 
In addition to political expediency and pay, colonial soldiers offered the advantage, in 
Italian commanders' eyes, of possessing physical and mental attributes relevant to 
prolonged campaigning in Libya. While not as elaborate as the British 'martial race' 
theory, early twentieth-century Italian officers and military scholars also developed a 
set of essentialist beliefs about the levels of effectiveness and virility of the various 
groups of colonial soldiers they employed. In 1914 Captain Corselli believed that 
colonial troops were better suited for colonial warfare than 'white' troops because 
they were more resistant to the weather and could better adapt to the terrain. He 
held 'Eritrean' troops – a catchphrase for East Africans more broadly –  in high 
regard. His comments about the Arabs were disparaging, describing them as disloyal 
and deceitful. He nevertheless argued that, with proper discipline, they could make 
fine soldiers.26 Writing in 1927, Colonel Guglielmo Nasi, who later went on to 
become a prominent figure in Italian East Africa, also believed that only Eritrean and 
Libyan troops should be used in colonial counter-insurgency campaign. He 
considered that units requiring a high level of mobility, 'white' troops were like 'a ball 
and chain' on the feet of colonial commanders.27 
 
One of the greatest exponents of the Italian military's typology of colonial groups 
was General Ottorino Mezzetti who spent a long time in command of troops in 
Tripolitania before being transferred to Cyrenaica in 1927. Mezzetti believed that 
'coloured' troops ‘have the best developed warrior instinct’. Left to their own 
devices, they knew well enough how to ‘make use of the terrain and fight’. Indeed, 
even under the most adverse circumstances, ascaris were able to draw on their 
'warlike virtues' (virtù guerriere).28 Like Nasi, Mezzetti believed that in combat the 
'national' (i.e. Italian) contingent was the most vulnerable and delicate part of the 
column. They struggled to fight without orders and their behaviour affected the 
'coloured' troops. Eritrean troops formed the ‘backbone and the ribs of the 
columns'. He praised their abilities as marchers, especially in mountainous terrain, 
commenting that with them and with the Libyans it was possible to cover 50 km in a 
day. The arrival of an Eritrean reserve, even a small one, could often decide the fate 
of a battle. Excellent warriors, 'the Eritreans feel excited and develop in the fight the 
bestial instincts of a warrior race (razza guerriera)'.29  
 
                                                
25 Gooch, 'Re-conquest and Suppression', p.1008. 
26 Goglia, 'Popolazioni, eserciti africani', pp.12-18. 
27 Goglia, 'Popolazioni, eserciti africani', p.26. 
28 Ottorino Mezzetti, Guerra in Libia: esperienze e ricordi (Rome: Paolo Cremonese, 1933), p.3, p.5. 
29 Mezzetti, Guerra in Libia, p.42. 
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Eritrean troops, however, suffered from some deficiencies and there were 
countervailing problems created by their employment in battle. In long marches, he 
argued, they tended to stray and lose sight of the column. Bearing in mind their 
tradition of acting independently, they found it difficult to march with other 
contingents. ‘Even today an excessively aggressive spirit pervades among the 
Eritreans, preventing them from drawing from fire all the advantages it offers’. If they 
broke through enemy lines a chase ensued and contact with their column and its 
commanders was often lost.30 Mezzetti also advised Italian commanders not to 
employ Eritrean ascaris in tasks such as breaking rocks for paving roads as such work 
might offend their warrior pride.31  
 
This type of essentialist thinking was also present in Badoglio's instructions. For 
instance, in May 1922 he noted that Eritrean troops had always proved themselves to 
be of the highest quality. Meanwhile Libyans had great potential, especially the 
Berbers who displayed courage and aggressiveness, characteristics which were always 
needed in colonial warfare. 32  By the summer of 1930, Badoglio had become 
convinced that Eritrean troops were the key to crushing the revolt in Cyrenaica,  
 
It is absolutely vital to abandon the Arab system of shooting from a distance 
and regarding it as a success if the enemy is forced to withdraw. This system, 
capable only of prolonging hostilities indefinitely, is also contrary to the 
fighting spirit and aggressive instincts of our brave Eritrean ascari.33  
 
Italian military leaders clearly grew accustomed to relying on troops raised in Eritrea. 
However, the East African colony was not always in a position to furnish all the 
manpower that was needed. 
 
The Eritrean Predicament 
The Italians were not the first imperial power to raise troops in one colony and then 
deploy them in another. John A. Hobson, a harsh critic of imperialism, ridiculed this 
practice in a British context long before the revolts in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica,  
 
Why should Englishmen fight the defensive or offensive wars of this Empire 
when cheaper, more numerous, and better-assimilated fighting material can be 
raised upon the spot, or transferred from one tropical dominion to another? 
As the labour of industrial development of tropical resources is put upon the 
‘lower races’ who reside there, under white superintendence, why should not 
militarism be organized upon the same basis, black or brown or yellow men, 
                                                
30 Mezzetti, Guerra in Libia, pp.42-43. 
31 Mezzetti, Guerra in Libia, p.4. 
32 Saini Fasanotti, Libia, p.119. 
33 Cited in: Rochat, 'The repression', p.80. 
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to whom military discipline will be ‘a wholesome education’, fighting for the 
British Empire under British officers?34 
 
As we have seen, Italian commanders thought very highly of Eritrean troops and 
these were often in demand. From the early months of 1912 until 1934 Italy had used 
no less than 68 Eritrean battalions and six artillery batteries in rotation for service in 
Libya.35 However, the over-reliance on Eritrean troops had a negative impact on the 
colony’s economy. It also introduced an element of tension into relations between 
colonial authorities in Rome and the administration in Asmara, the colony's capital.36 
Eritrea’s population, which was estimated at roughly 510,000 in the second half of 
the 1920s,37 was insufficient to furnish all the troops Italian colonial and military 
leaders wanted. Complaints from Italian officials in Eritrea about the strain 
recruitment placed on the colony were made even before the ‘re-conquest’ of Libya 
began. In response to urgent requests from Rome for more troops, Governor 
Giovanni Cerrina Feroni highlighted the ‘grave repercussions’ the subtraction of 
working hands would have on Eritrea’s economy and agriculture.38 He cautioned that 
Eritrea must not be reduced into a ‘seedbed’ of mercenary ascaris for the other 
colonies. With time, he argued, their excellent characteristics and the enthusiasm 
which distinguished them would be lost.39 
 
The relative calm in Libya in 1920-21 enabled the Italians to send back a number of 
battalions to Eritrea without replacing them. Instead, colonial officials in Eritrea were 
asked to furnish men for ‘the establishment and maintaining in efficiency of Libyan-
Eritrean battalions’.40 Officials in Eritrea did not want to undermine the morale and 
unit cohesion of their ‘organic’ Eritrean battalions. Moreover, recruitment in Eritrea 
could not sustain more than 12 battalions at any given time. Therefore, the troops 
that were sent to the so called ‘Libyan-Eritrean battalions’, which were soon much 
more aptly renamed ‘mixed’ battalions, were raised beyond Eritrea’s borders. The 
vast majority were to come from Ethiopia (primarily Amharans), but soldiers were 
also recruited in Sudan and Yemen.41  
 
                                                
34 John A. Hobson, Imperialism: a study (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010 [1902]), p.143. For 
more examples of colonial recruitment in British colonies in Africa, see: E. Whitehead, ‘A short history of 
Uganda military units formed during World War II’, Uganda Journal, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 (1950), pp.1-14; Timothy 
Parsons, The African Rank-And-File: Social Implications of Colonial Military Service in the King’s African Rifles, 
1902-1964, (Oxford: Heinemann, 1999). 
35 Alessandro Volterra, Sudditi coloniali: ascari eritrei 1935-1941, (Rome: Franco Angeli, 2005), p.43. 
36 Uoldelul Chelati Dirar, ‘From warriors to urban dwellers: Ascari and the military factor in the urban 
development of colonial Eritrea’, Cahiers d'études africaines, 175 (2004), pp.10-11. 
37 ASMAI, p.35/4, f.12/13.  
38 ACS, MAI, AS, b.1, Cerrina Feroni to Colonies Minister, 25 August 1920. 
39 ACS, MAI, AS, b.1, Cerrina Feroni to Colonies Minister, 6 May 1921. 
40 ACS, MAI, AS, b.1, annual report for 1920 of the RCTC of Eritrea, 1 May 1921. 
41 Volterra, Sudditi coloniali, p.45, p.49; Sullivan, ‘A thirst for glory’, pp. 219-220.  
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Recruiting men from Ethiopia was not without its problems. In November 1921, 
Cerrina Feroni explained to officials at the ministry for the colonies that Ethiopian 
recruits for the mixed Eritrean-Libyan battalions were scarce because of a veto 
imposed by Ethiopian chiefs. He added that soldiers recruited from beyond Eritrea’s 
borders must not be trained in the use of artillery as they might be induced by their 
chiefs to desert and could use their expertise in the service of another country.42 
Furthermore, the strong demand for working hands in Eritrea meant that Ethiopians 
preferred to enlist as labourers in the colony rather than as ascaris in the colonial 
army.43 Despite these reservations, Eritrea was able to supply the men requested 
once counter-insurgency operations in Libya began. In 1924-25, for instance, five 
‘organic’ battalions and an artillery battery, consisting of 4,301 men, were raised in 
the colony and dispatched to Libya. For the ‘mixed’ battalions 3,815 men were sent 
of whom 3,540, more than 92 percent, were recruited beyond Eritrea’s borders.44   
 
In Rome, military commanders and officials at the ministry for the colonies felt 
uneasy with the reliance on recruits from Ethiopia. Surveying the situation in an 
inter-ministerial committee for colonial military questions in 1926, Badoglio explained 
that in Eritrea, which ‘had the function of furnishing good coloured troops’, a grand 
programme to revitalise the local economy was obstructing recruitment. Somalia 
could not furnish anything of value. With regard to Yemen, where the Italians had 
been recruiting for a few years, the Minister for the Colonies Scalea explained that 
the local leader, Imam Yahya, could not spare any men because these were needed in 
case hostilities broke out with Ibn Saud. The committee noted that the Ethiopian 
regent, Ras Tafari (soon to become Emperor Haile Selassie), was willing to turn a 
blind eye to Italian recruitment for the time being. However, at the same time he 
also sought to centralise the powers of the state and create a national army. Hence, 
the ability to recruit in Ethiopia could dry up completely if tensions between Italy and 
Ethiopia were to rise. While various alternative options were considered, including 
recruitment in Albania and the Congo, no viable solution was found.45 The practice of 
enlisting Ethiopians continued without hindrance 46  According to Brian Sullivan, 
colonial officials in Rome implored Mussolini to avoid any actions that would 
undermine relations with Ras Tafari until Libya had been pacified. They did not want 
the regent to cut off the flow of Ethiopian recruits.47 
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The tone of Italian colonial officials in Eritrea began to change in September 1927, 
when the colony was confronted with an invasion of locusts which destroyed crops 
and severely destabilised the local economy. As a result of the locusts crisis there 
was a sharp increase in the number of Eritreans willing to enlist.48 While the reports 
of senior officers in Eritrea noted the dire economic state of the colony, afflicted by 
further locust invasions and a drought in 1928, recruitment patterns did not change 
significantly at first. The flow of recruits from beyond the colony’s borders continued 
and was described as ‘sufficient’. The large number of Eritreans wishing to escape 
economic hardship enabled the Italians to use more rigorous selection criteria when 
deciding who to recruit and it is likely that the proportion of Eritreans in the ‘mixed’ 
battalions rose, though the exact percentage is unknown.49 In 1929, with the lull in 
operations in Cyrenaica, the very low number of requests for recruits that Eritrea 
had received created discontent among the local population that had grown 
accustomed to seeing recruitment as a way of alleviating economic difficulties. In the 
first trimester of that year, only 77 men were sent to Libya while 2,570 returned, 
having completed their two-year service.50 Gone were the days of the early 1920s 
when colonial officials in Asmara pleaded for recruitment to be stopped. 
 
An official change in policy finally emerged in the second half of 1929. Article 66 of 
the official military regulations for Eritrea, which were drafted in the autumn of that 
year and signed by the King of Italy, stipulated that preference in recruitment was to 
be given to those born in the territory of Eritrea.51 The commander of the colonial 
army in Eritrea reported that this preference was given because of the plague of 
locusts, and also in adherence to the directives of the inter-ministerial committee of 
1926. The colonial army wanted to reduce the number of external recruits who 
received military training and at the same time to enlarge the numbers receiving 
military training among the colony’s population. However, the numbers sent to Libya 
during the third trimester still fell far short of the number returning.52 From the point 
of view of officials in Asmara, the situation began to improve in the first trimester of 
1930, owing to the increased demand for Eritrean troops in Cyrenaica. Following the 
re-organisation of General Graziani’s forces, to which we shall return below, the 
number of men who were sent to Libya increased sharply. The report for the third 
trimester of 1930 spoke of an ‘intense rhythm’ of recruitment and during the fourth 
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trimester the number of those being sent (1,135) far exceeded the number returning 
(369).53 
 
Service during the counter-insurgency in Libya left an impression on Eritrean popular 
culture and memory. The Eritrean literary figure and clergyman Gebreyesus Hailu 
wrote a short novel in Tigrinya in 1927, based on the story of an Eritrean soldier 
who had served in Libya. First published many years later, in 1950, the novel has 
recently been translated into English and given the title The Conscript, a misnomer as 
Eritrean recruits in general and Tuquabo, the novel's protagonist, in particular 
volunteered for service rather than being conscripted. Hailu records two types of 
responses to the departure of men for Libya. On the one hand there was youthful 
enthusiasm: 
 
This was a time when there was war going on in Tripoli, and it was 
deemed fitting for the people of Habesha to be willing to spill their 
blood in this war. The youth were singing, ‘He is a woman who refuses 
to go to Libya,’ and small children in return sang, ‘Come back to us 
later, Tribuli... give us time to grow up’54   
 
Conversely, there was also dismay at the immensity of the sacrifice: 'On the other 
hand, people back home were thinking about them and cried, "Our priests, why don't 
you speak out? Not even one young man can be found; all have gone to Tripoli"'.55   
 
Libyan Troops and the Question of Loyalty 
As Ahmida has pointed out, ‘in postcolonial Libyan historiography, collaboration with 
the Italian colonial state is poorly studied, in part because post-independence Libyan 
nationalism drew its stock of heroes, martyrs and legends from the anti-colonial 
resistance’. Those who 'went Italian' were considered to have been lacking in moral 
character.56 Yet service in the Italian colonial army was certainly not restricted to the 
margins of society. In just over 30 years of colonial rule tens of thousands of Libyans 
passed through the military, fulfilling a variety of roles. 
 
The Italians began to recruit Libyans to serve in irregular forces as early as February 
1912. Later that year the first regular Libyan battalion was raised. 57  Colonial 
authorities continually debated the trustworthiness of irregular bands. In November 
1916, for instance, the Minister for the Colonies, Gaspare Colosimo, implored 
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General Ameglio, the Governor of Tripolitania, not to create and arm an irregular 
band of 2,100 men. Such a force, he argued, could ‘contain the germ of a betrayal’ 
that would provide ‘the rebels with two thousand and one hundred 70/87 rifles with 
which to fight us.’58 However, at various stages of the counter-insurgency, the Italians 
found these highly mobile and well-adapted irregular troops indispensable. More than 
a thousand irregulars were used in Cyrenaica each year between 1925 and 1928, 
while in Tripolitania their number rose from just over a thousand a year in 1924-
1927 to 2,476 in late 1928.59  
  
As for regular Libyan troops, Italian commanders gradually began to appreciate their 
effectiveness. General Graziani, who was always well aware of the importance of 
propaganda, praised his locally raised forces after leading the repression of resistance 
in Tripolitania in the 1920s: ‘In all the period of the conquest and re-conquest of 
Libya, the Libyan battalions, alongside the Eritrean ones, fought with valour worthy of 
emulation and admiration’. Italian officers, he added, could feel ‘secure to find in 
them loyalty without limits, valour, heroism, a warlike spirit of exceptional nature 
and performance’.60 After a battle at Bir Tarsin on 26 May 1925, Graziani praised the 
loyalty and valour of the Libyan troops, whose heroism was ‘equal to that of the 
Eritreans’. He noted with satisfaction that not a single soldier deserted. ‘Our 
indigenous followers feel today not simply as a mercenary tool in our hands, but an 
integral and conscious part of the great mother Italy’. When called upon, they rush 
forward ‘willingly, ready to sacrifice’.61 The notion that the quality of Libyan troops 
might not fall short of the high standards of the Eritreans was shared by General 
Mezzetti, who successfully led Tripolitanian troops: ‘Libyan units, today, can compete 
in performance with Eritrean units’. Compared to the latter, he argued, the Libyans 
were much more resilient in enduring long marches, excessive heat and thirst. While 
‘less aggressive than the Eritreans, in battle they are equally tenacious’. Despite 
deficiencies in the way they were led, ‘the regular Libyan units maintain [their] loyalty 
and trustworthiness in every trial’.62   
 
However, in Cyrenaica the satisfaction of Italian commanders with their locally-raised 
troops was much more circumspect. The British anthropologist E. E. Evans-Pritchard, 
who conducted research on the Sanusi of Cyrenaica after the Second World War, 
pointed out that the Bedouins recruited by the Italians 'did not hesitate to assist the 
Patriots when an opportunity offered itself'. They passed to the rebels both rifles and 
even pay. Mock battles between the rebels and Italian-sponsored irregulars were 
used to hand over weapons and ammunition. The submitted tribes were a good 
                                                
58 ASMAI, p.115/3, f.36-37-38, Colosimo to Ameglio, 12 November 1916. 
59 ACS, MAI, AS, b.1, f.1/2. Libyans also served as guides, spies and in various other roles. 
60 Rodolfo Graziani, Verso il Fezzan, (Tripoli: F. Cacopardo, 1929), p.223.  
61 Graziani, Verso il Fezzan, p.366. 
62 Mezzetti, Guerra in Libia, p.43. 
British Journal for Military History, Volume 1, Issue 2, February 2015 
 
www.bjmh.org.uk 61 
source of intelligence for the rebels. Armed sottomessi would sometimes be found 
among rebel casualties following skirmishes with the Italians.63 After being transferred 
to Cyrenaica in 1927, General Mezzetti observed that following a hard-won battle, 
which ‘relieved the rebels of 50 soldiers and 200 camels, the next day the sottomessi 
will refurnish the rebels with another 50 soldiers and 200 camels’.64 Evans-Pritchard 
pointed out that 'in the end the Italians came to the conclusion that they could trust 
no Cyrenaican, least of all a Cyrenaican Bedouin'.65  
 
The dilemmas created by recruiting local troops came to a head in the summer of 
1930. In a series of messages to Colonial Minister Emilio De Bono and to Graziani in 
Benghazi, Badoglio explained that operations in Cyrenaica were put in jeopardy 
because the population and deserters collaborated with the rebels. In fact, the Italian 
army recruited from the same pool of men as the rebels did. Omar al-Mukhtar, he 
explained, ‘is extremely able both as commander and as organiser. A perfect 
information service enables him to refuse battle when the situation does not 
definitively favour him'. The Governor of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica wanted to use 
'mobile nuclei of troops, notable for their great offensive spirit and guaranteed 
loyalty, and thus composed of Eritreans’.66 Therefore, parallel to the removal of the 
civilian population from Jabal al-Akhdar to a series of concentration camps, Badoglio 
initiated a total reorganisation of the Italian colonial army in Cyrenaica. His goal was 
to deny the rebels information and ammunition. 
 
To reduce their dependency on ‘troops of little efficiency and doubtful loyalty’, the 
Italians dissolved the 10th and 12th Libyan battalions and also reduced the number of 
savari (cavalry troops) under arms in June 1930. 200 select men with proven combat 
experience were maintained and used to form a garrison company. During the same 
month the 2nd Eritrean battalion was called up and in July the 16th Eritrean battalion 
was reconstituted. In December 1930 a new Eritrean battalion, the 21st, was 
established, bringing the total number of Eritrean battalions in Cyrenaica from five in 
March to eight.67 In his memoirs from the pacification of Cyrenaica, Graziani pointed 
out that ‘this draconian measure, which struck the hearts of brave commanders and 
officers, damaged my own popularity and authority’. Officers pleaded with him to 
reconsider, arguing that desertion from their Libyan units was negligible. 68  He 
omitted to mention that he tried, more than once, to convince Badoglio to allow him 
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to use loyal troops from Tripolitania instead of Cyrenaican units. However, Badoglio 
was adamant that Graziani must make do with Eritrean troops.69 It was this re-
organisation of the Italian force in Cyrenaica which accounted for the ‘intense 
rhythm’ of recruitment in Eritrea in the second half of 1930.  
 
The irregular bands, which had often given direct or indirect assistance to the 
rebellion, were also cut in size. Their numbers were reduced to 900 in September 
1930, shrinking to 560 in early 1931. However, the Italians could not do without this 
force altogether. Therefore, to prevent leakage of ammunition to the rebels, all the 
irregulars had their rifles replaced. Instead of Mannlicher Carcano model 1891 – a 
rifle also used by the rebels – Italian commanders gave their irregular troops Vetterli-
Vitali model 1870/87 that had a different calibre, even though the latter was, in fact, 
inferior. Some irregulars tried to sabotage their 70/87 in the hope of being reissued 
mod. 91 rifles, but to no avail.70 In his memoirs Graziani noted with satisfaction that, 
after his capture, Omar al-Mukhtar admitted that these actions denied him sources 
of supply.71 But even after most of the Cyrenaican troops had been removed from 
frontline service, the Italians still relied heavily on Libyan manpower. The 
construction of the barrier along the Libyan-Egyptian border during the final months 
of the uprising was carried out by no less than 2,500 Libyans.72 
 
A War of Religion? 
There is a further factor at work which is far more difficult to quantify or determine: 
relations between Libyans and Eritreans. Not enough is known about how Italy's 
colonial soldiers viewed their service during the revolt in Libya. Historians have so 
far not been able to draw on first hand written accounts. Oral history interviews 
have shed light on the experiences of Libyan victims of Italian repression and of 
Eritrean soldiers who served in the Italian colonial army in the second half of the 
1930s and early 1940s.73 When it comes to colonial troops who took part in 
counter-insurgency operations in Libya the subaltern really does not have much of a 
voice. However, there are a number of second-hand accounts which suggest that the 
employment of East Africans in Libya fostered mutual hatred between the two 
subaltern groups. 
 
One of the harshest contemporary critics of Italy’s policy in Libya was the Danish 
traveller and journalist Knud Holmboe. A Muslim convert who had learnt Arabic in 
Morocco, Holmboe embarked on a daring voyage across North Africa in a car in 
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1930. His impressions from the journey were published in a memoir, Desert 
Encounters, which was translated into English but was banned in Italy. 74  While 
travelling through Tripolitania he noted that 'lots of Arab soldiers have been 
murdered in the most foul manner [by the rebels]. And they both spoke Arabic and 
had the same religion as the Bedouins.'75 However, once he arrived in Cyrenaica, he 
increasingly commented on the Italian reliance on Eritrean troops,   
 
In Arghela [probably Agaila] the difference between Tripoli and Cyrenaica 
made itself felt at once. Here there was not a single Arab soldier; they were 
all natives from the Italian colony of Eritrea. ‘Why don't you use Arab troops?’ 
I asked Colonel de Ronco during the evening.  
‘You can't trust them. They fraternize with the enemy.’  
‘But are the Eritreans any better?’  
‘They are more reliable. They hate the Arabs, who are Mohammedans, for 
they themselves are Christians. The Arabs here in Cyrenaica are exceedingly 
poor soldiers, while we can trust our brave troops from Eritrea implicitly.’  
‘Then the Arabs round here don't want to be soldiers?’  
‘No. It's not the same as in Tripoli. There is an unquenchable hatred between 
the Eritreans and the Bedouins. For instance, some years ago some of the 
Eritrean troops here in Arghela caught three Bedouins. They burnt them.’76  
 
When he asked Lieutenant-Colonel Piatti, stationed at Maraua, why there were so 
many troops from Eritrea in Cyrenaica, the latter said:  
 
Because they are the only troops we can depend on. The Arabs are lazy and 
unreliable, and run away at the slightest provocation, while the Eritreans on 
the contrary are absolutely loyal to us Italians. I myself have spent 
considerable time in Eritrea, and there we never had any trouble or 
rebellion.77  
 
Holmboe came to the conclusion that the Italians were fomenting religious hatred 
between the Eritreans and the Libyans. He reports hearing an address by Graziani to 
his colonial troops, 'New battles lie before you, but I know you will be victorious 
together with us Italians, who profess the same religion as you. Let us cry "Evvia" for 
Italy and her colony of Eritrea'.78 As he reached eastern Cyrenaica Holmboe was 
arrested by the Italian authorities. While in prison in Derna he asked the Libyan 
guards why they did this job, to which they replied, ‘Don't you think it is better to 
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have Moslems to look after the prisoners than Eritreans? When no Italian officers are 
about we can see that the prisoners have an easier time.’79 Finally, after his expulsion 
from Libya, Holmboe went to visit the exiled Sanusi leader and future King of Libya, 
Sayyid Idris, in Alexandria. The latter asked him ‘Do you know why the Italians are 
using Eritrean troops? […] Because the Eritreans are Christians. The Italians have 
created a religious war in Cyrenaica’.80 
 
Very few sources can corroborate Holmboe’s assertion of an Italian-induced war of 
religion. There is some evidence that, in Graziani’s propaganda of 1930, ‘the Askaris 
were reminded of their Christian duty to kill Moslems’.81 However, Graziani always 
tried to tailor his messages according to the composition of his audience. For 
instance, in a message to local notables and Islamic religious officials in Cyrenaica in 
spring 1930 he underlined the ‘absolute necessity to respect indigenous customs, 
religion and women.’82 Evans-Pritchard highlighted the importance of religion as a 
central cause which sustained the revolt, 
 
It then became simply a war of Muslims to defend their faith against a 
Christian Power. […] Without due appreciation of the religious feelings 
involved in the resistance it would, I think, be impossible to understand how it 
went on for so long against such overwhelming odds or how the tribes, with a 
long history of feuds dividing them, co-operated as much as they did under 
Sanusiya guidance.83 
 
However, he did not comment on how the East Africans fitted into this religious 
confrontation. It is very important to note that not all of Italy’s East African troops 
were Christian. A quick look at lists of deceased ascaris from Eritrea reveals several 
Muslim names.84 In fact, in the East African context, Muslim troops were deemed 
more loyal than Christians. In 1920 only Muslim soldiers could be recruited to 
artillery units, which received specialist training.85 In 1923 the ‘mixed’ battalion sent 
from Eritrea to Libya consisted of 1,179 Muslims and 5,059 Christians, though it is 
possible that this ratio changed by 1930.86 
 
The East African soldiers in Hailu’s The Conscript are Christians. Tuquabo's relations 
with his Muslim neighbours in Eritrea are very cordial and there is no sign of religious 
strife when the novel begins. However, the tone changes once Tuquabo arrives in 
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Libya where Italian-inspired negative stereotypes held by East African soldiers 
regarding the Arabs begin to appear: 
 
But for the Tigrinya the Arabs were notorious for bad behaviour. They were 
untrustworthy, treacherous, and they held grudges. They had the reputation 
for being merciless killers if they got the occasion. According to the 
stereotype that was passed along by the Italians, to say that an Arab would 
respect a deal would be to lie.87  
  
Hailu's account frames the East African-Libyan interaction in terms of historical 
enmity and racial prejudices rather than a war of religion. On the Libyan side, the 
poet Um al-Khair described the Eritrean guards at the concentration camp as 
‘kinsmen of the devil’.88 Moreover, the association of black Africans with slavery was 
still prevalent. Considering the brutal nature of the conflict – neither the rebels nor 
the Italians and their colonial soldiers took prisoners, except for interrogation and/or 
torture – it is unsurprising that mutual hatred evolved.   
 
The colonial involvement in the counter-insurgency in Libya left behind a bitter 
legacy. Hailu warned that, by becoming ‘instruments to occupy someone else’s 
country’, the East Africans were committing a grave error that may come back to 
haunt them, 
 
There may be some who think that fighting the Arabs on behalf of the Italians 
and exterminating them from the face of the earth was forgivable considering 
that the Arabs and black Africans were historically enemies. But what was 
being done would one day lead to one’s fall. If one day they come led by a 
Frenchman or an Italian to fight, didn’t the Habesha know that the Arabs were 
going to pay back with vengeance?89 
 
Hailu’s warning was not entirely unfounded. At the end of 1931 Libyan children 
between the ages of 6 and 15, who had been orphaned during the revolt, were 
placed in special camps that were run on military lines. In 1934 Graziani observed 
that these individuals were best suited for: 
 
the Libyan units of the royal corps of colonial troops, into which the first 
recruits have already entered from Marmarica, with about a hundred boys 
from the Margun and Soluk camps due next July; when these reach the 
                                                
87 Hailu, The Conscript, p.32. 
88 Ahmida, Forgotten Voices, p. 48 
89 Hailu, The Conscript, p.29. 
COLONIAL SOLDIERS IN LIBYA 1922-32 
 
 66 
maximum age limit (18 years), they will be enrolled in the VII and IX battalions 
of the new force.90   
 
These recruits formed part of the Libyan force that was sent to fight for Italy in the 
war against Ethiopia in 1935-36. In fact, the Libyan division in Ethiopia developed a 
reputation for taking no prisoners.91  
 
Conclusion 
To conclude, the counter-insurgency in Libya provides a striking example of the 
instrumental manner in which Italian authorities treated the troops they had raised in 
and around their colonies. It took colonial and military leaders time to learn how to 
adapt their manpower supply to highly varied local conditions, but eventually they 
succeeded. While it is difficult to accept at face value Graziani's assertions about the 
sacrificial willingness of his indigenous forces or their enthusiasm for Italy, it is clear 
that East African and Tripolitanian units were effective. Furthermore, throughout 
most of the counter-insurgency, East African and Libyan troops were able to serve 
together despite their cultural differences. In the final stages of pacification in 1930-
31 the Italians' reliance on East African troops increased. Highly mobile, well trained 
and, by this stage, sufficiently numerous, their trustworthiness offered the Italians a 
solution to the leakage of information and ammunition to the rebels. That the East 
African troops despised the local population and vice versa did not hinder, and 
perhaps even helped, Badoglio who had come around to the idea of crushing the 
rebels rather than trying to win Libyan hearts and minds. By no means unique to the 
Italian Empire or to the interwar period, the role played by indigenous soldiers in 
counter-insurgency campaigns deserves more attention. 
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